docs: promote /web from develop (live restore progress + PBS encryption UX refresh)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

web/messages/en/docs/backup-restore/destinations/pbs.json

@@ -52,9 +52,15 @@
     "heading": "Client-side encryption",
     "intro": "PBS client-side keyfile encryption encrypts chunks on the source host before upload. ProxMenux enables the feature with one added constraint: a recovery passphrase is mandatory when encryption is enabled. The passphrase does not protect the local keyfile; it protects the escrow copy of the keyfile that ProxMenux uploads to PBS for disaster recovery.",
     "keyfileTitle": "Keyfile",
-    "keyfileBody": "On first use, <code>proxmox-backup-client key create --kdf none</code> generates the keyfile at <code>/usr/local/share/proxmenux/pbs-key.conf</code> (<code>chmod 600</code>). Subsequent backups reuse it after a single confirmation dialog. If key creation fails, the backup is cancelled and the tool's error output is shown in a dialog.",
+    "keyfileBody": "The encryption prompt is a two-step yes/no. Step one asks whether to encrypt the backup: <em>No</em> continues without encryption; <em>Yes</em> moves to step two. Step two depends on whether a keyfile is already installed at <code>/usr/local/share/proxmenux/pbs-key.conf</code>. If it is, the installed keyfile is reused silently and the backup proceeds. If it is not, a two-option menu asks how to set one up: <em>Generate a new keyfile</em> runs <code>proxmox-backup-client key create --kdf none</code>, or <em>Import an existing keyfile</em> takes a path the operator supplies, validates it with <code>proxmox-backup-client key info</code> and installs it at the canonical path. Both branches run only after the recovery passphrase has been confirmed — cancelling any dialog before that point leaves the disk unchanged.",
+    "modesTitle": "Per-host or shared keyfile",
+    "modesIntro": "Both operating models are supported and neither is enforced — the choice belongs to the operator based on how their fleet is organised.",
+    "modesPerHostTitle": "Per-host keyfile (default)",
+    "modesPerHostBody": "Each host generates its own keyfile the first time it enables PBS encryption. Isolation is maximum: compromising the keyfile of one host does not expose the backups of any other. Each host has its own paired recovery blob on PBS, restorable with the recovery passphrase of that host. Recommended for production fleets and for environments where hosts have different owners or compliance boundaries.",
+    "modesSharedTitle": "Shared keyfile (import on every host)",
+    "modesSharedBody": "One master keyfile generated once and installed on every host via the <em>Import</em> option. Management is simpler: a single secret to safeguard, a single recovery blob works for every host, and any host can decrypt the archives of any other (useful for consolidation, cross-host restore drills, or centralised backup verification). The trade-off is that a leak of the shared keyfile exposes every host at once. Recommended for homelabs and for fleets where all hosts have the same owner and trust boundary.",
     "recoveryTitle": "Recovery passphrase and escrow blob",
-    "recoveryBody": "After the keyfile is created, ProxMenux prompts twice for a recovery passphrase (with match validation) and runs <code>openssl</code> to produce <code>pbs-key.recovery.enc</code> — the keyfile encrypted with the passphrase. A copy is written to <code>/root/pbs-key.recovery-HOSTNAME-YYYYMMDD.enc</code> for offsite storage. Cancelling the passphrase dialog wipes the freshly-created keyfile.",
+    "recoveryBody": "The recovery passphrase is asked BEFORE any keyfile is written to disk. ProxMenux prompts twice with match validation; then, only if the operator confirms, the keyfile is created (or imported) and <code>openssl</code> produces <code>pbs-key.recovery.enc</code> — the keyfile encrypted with the passphrase. A copy is written to <code>/root/pbs-key.recovery-HOSTNAME-YYYYMMDD.enc</code> for offsite storage. Cancelling the passphrase dialog leaves the disk untouched — no keyfile is created and no cleanup is needed.",
     "blobUploadTitle": "Paired backup group on PBS",
     "blobUploadBody1": "After a PBS backup that used the keyfile, the escrow blob is uploaded as a second backup group: <code>host/hostcfg-HOSTNAME-keyrecovery/BACKUP-TIME</code>. The shared <code>hostcfg-HOSTNAME</code> prefix places both groups adjacent in the PBS UI; the <code>-keyrecovery</code> suffix labels the relationship. The upload runs without <code>--keyfile</code> (the blob is already passphrase-protected by openssl) and only when the current backup used the keyfile.",
     "blobUploadConstraintTitle": "Why two groups",