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Bring the web documentation in line with develop in every language
- English pages describe backups, the manifest, ROCm GPUs, OCI host directories and storage as develop does, and say user instead of operator - New paragraph on host directories mounted with everything the host has mounted inside them, and a new update rule for host directories - The Proxmox Backup Server section of the post-install page is translated into every language - Spanish and the other six languages follow the updated English
This commit is contained in:
MacRimi
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
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{
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"type": "local",
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"url": "/backup/borgbackup (any absolute path)",
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"detail": "Repository lives on a local directory. Meaningful only when the target directory is on a separate physical disk — a repository on the same disk as the source protects against operator error but not against disk failure."
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"detail": "Repository lives on a local directory. Meaningful only when the target directory is on a separate physical disk — a repository on the same disk as the source protects against user error but not against disk failure."
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}
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]
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},
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@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@
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},
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{
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"requirement": "A writable repository directory",
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"detail": "The path the operator gives ProxMenux (for example <code>/backup/borgbackup</code>) must exist on the server and be owned by the borg user."
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"detail": "The path the user gives ProxMenux (for example <code>/backup/borgbackup</code>) must exist on the server and be owned by the borg user."
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},
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{
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"requirement": "SSH daemon accepting the borg user",
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@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@
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{
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"mode": "generate-manual",
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"label": "No admin password on this host",
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"detail": "ProxMenux generates the keypair as above but displays the full <code>authorized_keys</code> line for the operator to paste manually into the server. The admin password never leaves the ProxMenux host because it is never asked for."
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"detail": "ProxMenux generates the keypair as above but displays the full <code>authorized_keys</code> line for the user to paste manually into the server. The admin password never leaves the ProxMenux host because it is never asked for."
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},
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{
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"mode": "generate-pct",
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@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@
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{
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"mode": "existing",
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"label": "Use an existing key",
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"detail": "ProxMenux scans <code>/root/.ssh/</code> and <code>$HOME/.ssh/</code> for parseable ed25519/RSA private keys and lists them. The operator picks one or browses manually to a non-standard path."
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"detail": "ProxMenux scans <code>/root/.ssh/</code> and <code>$HOME/.ssh/</code> for parseable ed25519/RSA private keys and lists them. The user picks one or browses manually to a non-standard path."
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},
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{
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"mode": "none",
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@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@
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},
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{
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"file": "borg-pass-NAME.txt",
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"content": "Passphrase for the target NAMEd above (<code>chmod 600</code>). Only present when the operator chose repokey encryption."
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"content": "Passphrase for the target NAMEd above (<code>chmod 600</code>). Only present when the user chose repokey encryption."
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}
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],
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"outro": "Saving the target is optional. Declining the save prompt omits the named target configuration, but does not remove a generated SSH key. If repokey encryption is enabled without a saved target, ProxMenux still saves the passphrase in the legacy borg-pass.txt file."
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@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@
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},
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"sameArchive": {
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"heading": "The archive layout does not change with the destination",
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"body": "Inside any of the three destinations, the same <code>rootfs/</code> + <code>metadata/</code> + <code>manifest.json</code> layout described in <em>How it works</em> is present. A <code>.tar.zst</code> extracted from a local archive, a <code>.pxar</code> restored from PBS, and a Borg archive extracted with <code>borg extract</code> all yield an identical directory tree. The restore code path (<code>_rs_check_layout</code>, <code>_rs_apply</code>, <code>_rs_prepare_pending_restore</code>) reads the same three payloads without knowing which destination they came from."
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"body": "Wherever the backup is stored, it always holds the same three blocks described in <em>How it works</em>: the filesystem (<code>rootfs/</code>), the metadata (<code>metadata/</code>) and the manifest (<code>manifest.json</code>). Extracting a local <code>.tar.zst</code> archive, restoring a <code>.pxar</code> from PBS or extracting a Borg archive all yield an identical directory tree. The restore therefore always reads the same files, whichever destination the backup comes from."
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},
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"extractStandalone": {
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"heading": "Extracting a backup outside of ProxMenux",
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@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
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},
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"targetConfig": {
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"heading": "Configuring the target directory",
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"intro": "The local destination is a <strong>single persisted target directory</strong> — not a list. ProxMenux stores the operator's choice at <code>/usr/local/share/proxmenux/local-target.conf</code> and reads it on every backup. When no target has been configured, the default <code>HB_LOCAL_TARGET_DEFAULT = /var/lib/vz/dump</code> is used (the same directory Proxmox uses for its own <code>vzdump</code> outputs). The target is configured from <em>Configure backup destinations → Local destinations</em>:",
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"intro": "The local destination is a <strong>single persisted target directory</strong> — not a list. ProxMenux stores the user's choice at <code>/usr/local/share/proxmenux/local-target.conf</code> and reads it on every backup. When no target has been configured, the default <code>HB_LOCAL_TARGET_DEFAULT = /var/lib/vz/dump</code> is used (the same directory Proxmox uses for its own <code>vzdump</code> outputs). The target is configured from <em>Configure backup destinations → Local destinations</em>:",
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"options": [
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"<strong>Use default (<code>/var/lib/vz/dump</code>).</strong> The Proxmox local storage. Present on every Proxmox install; the archive sits next to vzdump outputs and is picked up by the Monitor's Backups tab automatically.",
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"<strong>Enter a custom path.</strong> Any absolute filesystem path can be used: an NFS mount, an SMB share mounted via <code>fstab</code>, a dedicated ZFS dataset, a second internal disk. ProxMenux validates that the path exists and is a directory before persisting it.",
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@@ -30,11 +30,23 @@
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"intro": "The USB submenu lists partitions on removable devices reported by <code>lsblk</code>. Each partition is presented with its size, filesystem label and current state. The state determines the action ProxMenux offers.",
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"statesTitle": "The three device states",
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"stateRows": [
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{ "state": "mounted", "shown": "Size · label · [fstype] · → /mount/point", "action": "The partition is already mounted somewhere. Selecting it persists the current mount point as the local target. No mounting is performed." },
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{ "state": "unmounted", "shown": "Size · label · [fstype] · (not mounted — will be mounted)", "action": "A filesystem is present but not mounted. On confirmation, ProxMenux runs <code>hb_mount_usb_partition</code>: creates <code>/mnt/backup-LABEL</code> (or a UUID-based path if there is no label), mounts the partition and persists the mount point as the local target." },
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{ "state": "empty", "shown": "Size · raw USB disk — no filesystem (will be FORMATTED)", "action": "The device has no filesystem. A destructive path — protected by two confirmations. First a Yes/No dialog explains that the operation will erase the disk. Second, an inputbox requires the operator to <strong>type the exact device path</strong> (e.g. <code>/dev/sdb</code>) before ProxMenux creates a fresh GPT + ext4 partition and mounts it." }
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{
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"state": "mounted",
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"shown": "Size · label · [fstype] · → /mount/point",
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"action": "The partition is already mounted somewhere. Selecting it persists the current mount point as the local target. No mounting is performed."
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},
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{
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"state": "unmounted",
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"shown": "Size · label · [fstype] · (not mounted — will be mounted)",
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"action": "A filesystem is present but not mounted. On confirmation, ProxMenux runs <code>hb_mount_usb_partition</code>: creates <code>/mnt/backup-LABEL</code> (or a UUID-based path if there is no label), mounts the partition and persists the mount point as the local target."
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},
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{
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"state": "empty",
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"shown": "Size · raw USB disk — no filesystem (will be FORMATTED)",
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"action": "The device has no filesystem. A destructive path — protected by two confirmations. First a Yes/No dialog explains that the operation will erase the disk. Second, an inputbox requires the user to <strong>type the exact device path</strong> (e.g. <code>/dev/sdb</code>) before ProxMenux creates a fresh GPT + ext4 partition and mounts it."
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}
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],
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"notMountedFallback": "When no USB device is detected, the submenu falls back to a plain inputbox. The operator can enter an arbitrary mount point path; if the path is not a registered mount point, a confirmation dialog warns before proceeding."
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"notMountedFallback": "When no USB device is detected, the submenu falls back to a plain inputbox. The user can enter an arbitrary mount point path; if the path is not a registered mount point, a confirmation dialog warns before proceeding."
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},
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"safetyCheck": {
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"heading": "Safety check — destination inside a backup path",
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@@ -45,7 +57,7 @@
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"intro": "The output filename embeds the source hostname and the backup timestamp so that a directory holding several archives sorts chronologically and each file is self-identifying.",
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"namePattern": "hostcfg-HOSTNAME-YYYYMMDD_HHMMSS.tar.zst",
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"compressionTitle": "Compression",
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"compressionBody": "The primary path uses <code>tar --zstd -cf</code> — a single-command pipeline that compresses at zstd's default level. When <code>zstd</code> is not present on the source (rare on Proxmox but possible on minimal installs), ProxMenux falls back to <code>gzip</code>. In the fallback path, if <code>pv</code> is available, a progress bar is added to the pipeline so the operator sees the archive size grow in real time; without <code>pv</code>, plain <code>tar -czf</code> is used silently.",
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"compressionBody": "The primary path uses <code>tar --zstd -cf</code> — a single-command pipeline that compresses at zstd's default level. When <code>zstd</code> is not present on the source (rare on Proxmox but possible on minimal installs), ProxMenux falls back to <code>gzip</code>. In the fallback path, if <code>pv</code> is available, a progress bar is added to the pipeline so the user sees the archive size grow in real time; without <code>pv</code>, plain <code>tar -czf</code> is used silently.",
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"sourceTitle": "What goes into the archive",
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"sourceBody": "The tar command is invoked with <code>-C \"$staging_root\" .</code>, which archives the <strong>full staging root</strong>: <code>rootfs/</code>, <code>metadata/</code> and <code>manifest.json</code>. All three payloads land side by side at the top of the tarball. Extracting the archive produces the exact same tree that the restore code consumes."
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},
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@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
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},
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"repoSelection": {
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"heading": "Repository selection",
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"intro": "ProxMenux discovers PBS repositories from two sources on every backup. The operator picks one from a unified menu; the choice determines <code>HB_PBS_REPOSITORY</code>, <code>HB_PBS_SECRET</code> and <code>HB_PBS_FINGERPRINT</code> for the run.",
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"intro": "ProxMenux discovers PBS repositories from two sources on every backup. The user picks one from a unified menu; for that run, the choice determines which server and datastore the backup is sent to, the password it authenticates with and the <em>fingerprint</em> that validates the certificate.",
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"sourceRows": [
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{
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"source": "Proxmox storage.cfg (auto-discovered)",
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@@ -37,43 +37,43 @@
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}
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],
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"menuTitle": "Selection menu",
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"menuBody": "Both sources are shown in a single menu, each row tagged with its origin (<code>[proxmox]</code> or <code>[manual]</code>). Entries whose password could not be resolved are tagged with a <code>⚠ no password</code> warning — selecting one triggers a password re-entry before the backup starts. The fingerprint is passed to <code>proxmox-backup-client</code> via the <code>PBS_FINGERPRINT</code> environment variable; when absent, the client asks the operator to accept the server certificate interactively on the first backup."
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"menuBody": "Both sources are shown in a single menu, each row tagged with its origin (<code>[proxmox]</code> or <code>[manual]</code>). Entries whose password could not be resolved are tagged with a <code>⚠ no password</code> warning — selecting one triggers a password re-entry before the backup starts. The fingerprint is passed to <code>proxmox-backup-client</code> via the <code>PBS_FINGERPRINT</code> environment variable; when absent, the client asks the user to accept the server certificate interactively on the first backup."
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},
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"backupCommand": {
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"heading": "The backup command",
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"intro": "The upload is a single invocation of <code>proxmox-backup-client backup</code>. ProxMenux uses <code>env</code> to pass the password, encryption password and fingerprint to the client as environment variables.",
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"cmd": "env \\\n PBS_PASSWORD=\"$HB_PBS_SECRET\" \\\n PBS_ENCRYPTION_PASSWORD=\"$HB_PBS_ENC_PASS\" \\\n PBS_FINGERPRINT=\"$HB_PBS_FINGERPRINT\" \\\n proxmox-backup-client backup \\\n hostcfg.pxar:$staging_root \\\n --repository USER@REALM@HOST:DATASTORE \\\n --backup-type host \\\n --backup-id hostcfg-HOSTNAME \\\n --backup-time BACKUP-EPOCH \\\n [--keyfile /usr/local/share/proxmenux/pbs-key.conf]",
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"backupIdTitle": "Backup ID naming",
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"backupIdBody": "The default backup ID is <code>hostcfg-HOSTNAME</code>. The operator is asked to confirm or edit it before the upload; any characters outside <code>[A-Za-z0-9_-]</code> are stripped and trailing dashes are trimmed. Reusing the same ID across runs is intentional — PBS treats the ID as a <em>group</em>, and every subsequent backup appears as a new backup inside that group, sharing dedup with prior runs.",
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"backupIdBody": "The default backup ID is <code>hostcfg-HOSTNAME</code>. The user is asked to confirm or edit it before the upload; any characters outside <code>[A-Za-z0-9_-]</code> are stripped and trailing dashes are trimmed. Reusing the same ID across runs is intentional — PBS treats the ID as a <em>group</em>, and every subsequent backup appears as a new backup inside that group, sharing dedup with prior runs.",
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"pxarTitle": "Why the source is the full staging root",
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"pxarBody": "The <code>.pxar</code> source is the entire <code>staging_root</code> — <code>rootfs/</code>, <code>metadata/</code> and <code>manifest.json</code> together. Earlier versions passed <code>$staging_root/rootfs</code> as the source; that left <code>metadata/</code> out of the archive and the restore's compatibility check had nothing to read, degrading to cross-host warnings even on same-host restores. Old backups created with the rootfs-only source still restore correctly via <code>_rs_check_layout</code>'s case-3 branch, which wraps a flat <code>etc/var/root/usr</code> tree back into a <code>rootfs/</code> hierarchy."
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"pxarBody": "The <code>.pxar</code> archive packs the whole working directory: the host filesystem (<code>rootfs/</code>), the metadata (<code>metadata/</code>) and the manifest (<code>manifest.json</code>). On restore, ProxMenux compares the manifest with the target host to tell whether they are equivalent, whether the hardware changed or whether it is a different machine, and adjusts the process accordingly. Older backups, made by earlier ProxMenux versions that packed only the filesystem, still restore correctly: the restore detects that legacy format and rearranges it automatically."
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},
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"encryption": {
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"heading": "Client-side encryption",
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"glossaryHint": "This section uses the terms <em>keyfile</em>, <em>passphrase</em> and <em>recovery envelope</em>. The <glosarioLink>glossary</glosarioLink> summarises the differences in one sentence per term.",
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"intro": "PBS client-side keyfile encryption encrypts chunks on the source host before upload. In ProxMenux encryption is optional; when enabled, whether to also upload a passphrase-wrapped copy of the keyfile to PBS as a recovery escrow is an explicit yes/no choice the operator makes at setup time (and can revisit later from the Monitor). The keyfile itself always lives at one canonical path on the host — <code>/usr/local/share/proxmenux/pbs-key.conf</code> — and is reused silently by every subsequent encrypted backup.",
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"intro": "PBS client-side keyfile encryption encrypts chunks on the source host before upload. In ProxMenux encryption is optional; when enabled, whether to also upload a passphrase-wrapped copy of the keyfile to PBS as a recovery escrow is an explicit yes/no choice the user makes at setup time (and can revisit later from the Monitor). The keyfile itself always lives at one canonical path on the host — <code>/usr/local/share/proxmenux/pbs-key.conf</code> — and is reused silently by every subsequent encrypted backup.",
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"keyfileTitle": "Setting up the keyfile",
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"keyfileBody": "The encryption prompt runs at the first encrypted backup on the host. Step one asks whether to encrypt the backup: <em>No</em> continues without encryption; <em>Yes</em> moves to step two. Step two depends on whether a keyfile is already installed at <code>/usr/local/share/proxmenux/pbs-key.conf</code>. If it is, the installed keyfile is reused silently and the backup proceeds — subsequent backups never re-ask. If it is not, a two-option menu asks how to set one up. <em>Generate a new keyfile</em> runs <code>proxmox-backup-client key create --kdf none</code>. <em>Use an existing keyfile</em> auto-detects a PVE-managed keyfile: when the selected PBS repository is registered in Proxmox with an encryption key at <code>/etc/pve/priv/storage/<NAME>.enc</code>, that file is copied to the ProxMenux canonical path silently and the flow continues. When no PVE-managed keyfile matches the repository, an input prompts for the absolute path where the operator has already placed the keyfile on this host. Either way, the file lands at the canonical path with <code>chmod 600</code>.",
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"keyfileBody": "The encryption prompt runs at the first encrypted backup on the host. Step one asks whether to encrypt the backup: <em>No</em> continues without encryption; <em>Yes</em> moves to step two. Step two depends on whether a keyfile is already installed at <code>/usr/local/share/proxmenux/pbs-key.conf</code>. If it is, the installed keyfile is reused silently and the backup proceeds — subsequent backups never re-ask. If it is not, a two-option menu asks how to set one up. <em>Generate a new keyfile</em> runs <code>proxmox-backup-client key create --kdf none</code>. <em>Use an existing keyfile</em> auto-detects a PVE-managed keyfile: when the selected PBS repository is registered in Proxmox with an encryption key at <code>/etc/pve/priv/storage/<NAME>.enc</code>, that file is copied to the ProxMenux canonical path silently and the flow continues. When no PVE-managed keyfile matches the repository, an input prompts for the absolute path where the user has already placed the keyfile on this host. Either way, the file lands at the canonical path with <code>chmod 600</code>.",
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"modesTitle": "Per-host or shared keyfile",
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"modesIntro": "Both operating models are supported and neither is enforced — the choice belongs to the operator based on how their fleet is organised.",
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"modesIntro": "Both operating models are supported and neither is enforced — the choice belongs to the user based on how their fleet is organised.",
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"modesPerHostTitle": "Per-host keyfile (default)",
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"modesPerHostBody": "Each host generates its own keyfile the first time it enables PBS encryption. Isolation is maximum: compromising the keyfile of one host does not expose the backups of any other. Recommended for production fleets and for environments where hosts have different owners or compliance boundaries.",
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"modesSharedTitle": "Shared keyfile (import on every host)",
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"modesSharedBody": "One master keyfile generated once and installed on every host via the <em>Use an existing keyfile</em> option. Management is simpler: a single secret to safeguard, and any host can decrypt the archives of any other (useful for consolidation, cross-host restore drills or centralised backup verification). The trade-off is that a leak of the shared keyfile exposes every host at once. Recommended for homelabs and for fleets where all hosts have the same owner and trust boundary.",
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"recoveryTitle": "Upload key to PBS — the operator decides",
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"recoveryTitle": "Upload key to PBS — the user decides",
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"recoveryBody": "Right after the keyfile is chosen, ProxMenux asks a single explicit question — <em>Upload key to PBS?</em> — with two answers. <strong>No recovery artifact is uploaded to PBS until the operator answers Yes.</strong> The default is <em>No, keep local only</em>: the keyfile stays at the canonical local path, ProxMenux uploads no recovery artifact to PBS, and the operator handles the offsite copy themselves (the Monitor’s <em>Download keyfile</em> button in the PBS destination row provides one on demand). Choosing <em>Yes, upload</em> prompts for a recovery passphrase — twice, with match validation — and ProxMenux wraps the keyfile with that passphrase using AES-256-CBC and PBKDF2 (600 000 iterations, random salt) to produce <code>pbs-key.recovery.enc</code>. Every subsequent encrypted backup uploads that envelope to PBS as a paired backup group. Neither the passphrase nor a plaintext copy of the keyfile is sent to PBS during these uploads. The choice can be changed later from the Monitor at any time — the escrow toggle inline in the PBS destination row flips Yes/No and applies immediately (Start uploading, Stop uploading, or Update passphrase, matching the current state).",
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"blobUploadTitle": "Paired backup group on PBS",
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"blobUploadBody1": "When the escrow mode is <em>Yes, upload</em>, ProxMenux uploads the recovery envelope to PBS after every encrypted backup as a second, paired backup group with the same name as the host group but ending in <code>-keyrecovery</code>. The two groups sit next to each other in the datastore listing — one for host backups, one for recovery envelopes. <strong>The envelope never leaves the host in plaintext</strong>: encryption happens on the host itself with AES-256-CBC and PBKDF2 before any bytes go on the wire (<code>openssl enc -aes-256-cbc -pbkdf2 -iter 600000 -salt</code>). PBS receives only the already-encrypted envelope.",
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"blobUploadBody1": "When the answer is <em>Yes, upload</em>, ProxMenux uploads the recovery envelope to PBS after every encrypted backup as a second, paired backup group with the same name as the host group but ending in <code>-keyrecovery</code>. The two groups sit next to each other in the datastore listing — one for host backups, one for recovery envelopes. <strong>The envelope never leaves the host in plaintext</strong>: encryption happens on the host itself with AES-256-CBC and PBKDF2 before any bytes go on the wire (<code>openssl enc -aes-256-cbc -pbkdf2 -iter 600000 -salt</code>). PBS receives only the already-encrypted envelope.",
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"envelopeSecurityTitle": "Is uploading the keyrecovery file to PBS a security risk?",
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"envelopeSecurityBody": "The keyrecovery file is encrypted in transit and at rest. The recovery passphrase never leaves the host: encryption happens locally before the upload, and PBS only ever sees the already-encrypted result. A PBS administrator — or anyone with access to the datastore — can download the keyrecovery file, but without the recovery passphrase they cannot read the keyfile inside: it is opaque ciphertext. Reconstructing the keyfile requires both pieces at once, the keyrecovery file and the passphrase, and only the operator holds both.",
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"envelopeSecurityBody": "The keyrecovery file is encrypted in transit and at rest. The recovery passphrase never leaves the host: encryption happens locally before the upload, and PBS only ever sees the already-encrypted result. A PBS administrator — or anyone with access to the datastore — can download the keyrecovery file, but without the recovery passphrase they cannot read the keyfile inside: it is opaque ciphertext. Reconstructing the keyfile requires both pieces at once, the keyrecovery file and the passphrase, and only the user holds both.",
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"blobUploadConstraintTitle": "Why two groups instead of a single encrypted one",
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"blobUploadConstraintBody": "A single <code>proxmox-backup-client backup</code> invocation encrypts every one of its archives with the same keyfile, or none at all — there is no in-between. The host backup has to be encrypted with the host keyfile, but the recovery envelope cannot ride along in that same upload, because it would end up encrypted with the very keyfile it contains: on a freshly reinstalled host there would be no way to open it (you would need the keyfile to decrypt the keyfile). That is why the two artefacts are uploaded independently and appear as two separate groups: the host backup is encrypted by the PBS client with the keyfile, and the recovery envelope is encrypted by ProxMenux with the passphrase before upload. Two different encryption layers protecting two different assets.",
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"blobUploadImageAlt": "PBS UI showing the hostcfg-HOSTNAME and hostcfg-HOSTNAME-keyrecovery backup groups adjacent in the datastore listing.",
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"blobUploadImageCaption": "PBS UI — the paired backup groups. The main group holds the host backups; the -keyrecovery group holds the passphrase-wrapped keyfile.",
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"recoverTitle": "Recovery on a fresh host",
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"recoverBody": "When the local keyfile is missing at the canonical path — on a freshly reinstalled host, or after an explicit removal — the restore flow tries three sources in order and stops at the first one that produces a usable keyfile. First, when the selected PBS repository has a matching PVE-managed keyfile at <code>/etc/pve/priv/storage/<NAME>.enc</code>, that file is copied to the canonical path silently. Second, when a <code>-keyrecovery</code> group is available on PBS, the newest snapshot is downloaded and the operator is asked for the recovery passphrase to decrypt it. Third, when neither of the above works or the operator declines them, an input prompts for the absolute path where the keyfile lives on this host and copies it to the canonical path. The Monitor exposes the same import flow inline in the backup detail modal — an amber panel appears at the top of the modal when Restore, Download or View contents would need a keyfile that is not installed. When a keyfile is installed but does not match the one that encrypted the backup, PBS returns a <code>wrong key — manifest's key XX does not match provided key YY</code> error; the same three actions display a structured amber panel with the required manifest fingerprint prominently rendered, so the operator can identify which keyfile to import to open that specific backup.",
|
||||
"recoverBody": "When the local keyfile is missing at the canonical path — on a freshly reinstalled host, or after an explicit removal — the restore flow tries three sources in order and stops at the first one that produces a usable keyfile. First, when the selected PBS repository has a matching PVE-managed keyfile at <code>/etc/pve/priv/storage/<NAME>.enc</code>, that file is copied to the canonical path silently. Second, when a <code>-keyrecovery</code> group is available on PBS, the newest snapshot is downloaded and the user is asked for the recovery passphrase to decrypt it. Third, when neither of the above works or the user declines them, an input prompts for the absolute path where the keyfile lives on this host and copies it to the canonical path. The Monitor exposes the same import flow inline in the backup detail modal — an amber panel appears at the top of the modal when Restore, Download or View contents would need a keyfile that is not installed. When a keyfile is installed but does not match the one that encrypted the backup, PBS returns a <code>wrong key — manifest's key XX does not match provided key YY</code> error; the same three actions display a structured amber panel with the required manifest fingerprint prominently rendered, so the user can identify which keyfile to import to open that specific backup.",
|
||||
"monitorManagementTitle": "Managing the keyfile from the Monitor",
|
||||
"monitorManagementBody": "The Monitor exposes the keyfile controls inline in each PBS destination row of the backup configuration page. The row shows three actions: <em>Download</em> exports the current keyfile to the operator's browser, <em>Upload</em> replaces the installed keyfile with one supplied by the operator (the previous file is overwritten only after the new one lands successfully at the canonical path), and <em>Delete</em> removes the keyfile from the host. The recovery-escrow toggle is a single inline control next to those actions: a Yes/No radio for <em>Upload key to PBS?</em>, a passphrase field when Yes is selected, and a contextual Apply button that reads <em>Start uploading</em>, <em>Stop uploading</em> or <em>Update passphrase</em> depending on the current state. Every action goes through the same Flask endpoints that the shell TUI uses, so the on-disk effect and the state on PBS are identical whichever surface the operator picks."
|
||||
"monitorManagementBody": "The Monitor shows the keyfile controls in each PBS destination row of the backup configuration page. The row has three actions: <em>Download</em> exports the current keyfile to the user's browser, <em>Upload</em> replaces the installed keyfile with one supplied by the user (the previous file is overwritten only after the new one has arrived correctly at its path), and <em>Delete</em> removes the keyfile from the host. Right next to them is the switch of the recovery envelope: a Yes/No for <em>Upload key to PBS?</em>, a passphrase field that appears when Yes is selected, and a button that follows the current state: <em>Start uploading</em>, <em>Stop uploading</em> or <em>Update passphrase</em>. The Monitor controls and the shell dialog do the same underneath, so the result on disk and on PBS is identical whichever one is used."
|
||||
},
|
||||
"restoreAccess": {
|
||||
"heading": "Retrieval on the restore side",
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user