harden auth gateway

This commit is contained in:
Eduardo Silva
2026-11-21 12:26:28 -03:00
parent dd81ff6318
commit 7fd1a4fbc3
12 changed files with 195 additions and 60 deletions
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ import time
ALTCHA_MAX_NUMBER = 1_000_000
CHALLENGE_TTL_SECONDS = 300 # 5 minutes
CHALLENGE_COOKIE_NAME = "auth_gateway_challenge"
# Nonces of challenge cookies revoked after a failed login: a script keeping the old cookie must solve a new challenge
_revoked_nonces: dict[str, float] = {}
def generate_altcha_challenge(hmac_key: str) -> dict:
@@ -63,7 +65,20 @@ def verify_challenge_cookie(cookie_value: str, secret: str) -> bool:
expected_sig = hmac.new(secret.encode(), message.encode(), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
if not hmac.compare_digest(expected_sig, sig):
return False
timestamp = int(message.split(".")[0])
return (time.time() - timestamp) < CHALLENGE_TTL_SECONDS
timestamp, nonce = message.split(".")
if nonce in _revoked_nonces:
return False
return (time.time() - int(timestamp)) < CHALLENGE_TTL_SECONDS
except Exception:
return False
def revoke_challenge_cookie(cookie_value: str | None) -> None:
"""Make a challenge cookie invalid before it expires."""
now = time.time()
for nonce, revoked_at in list(_revoked_nonces.items()):
if now - revoked_at > CHALLENGE_TTL_SECONDS:
del _revoked_nonces[nonce]
parts = (cookie_value or "").split(".")
if len(parts) == 3 and parts[1]:
_revoked_nonces[parts[1]] = now
@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
from dataclasses import dataclass
from auth_gateway.models.auth import OIDCMethodModel
from authlib.integrations.starlette_client import OAuth
from auth_gateway.models.auth import OIDCMethodModel
@dataclass
class OIDCIdentity:
@@ -45,6 +46,9 @@ class OIDCService:
if "userinfo" in token and isinstance(token["userinfo"], dict):
claims.update(token["userinfo"])
email = claims.get("email")
# An email the provider did not verify can be set by the user, so it must not pass the allowlists
if str(claims.get("email_verified", True)).lower() == "false":
email = None
subject = claims.get("sub")
return OIDCIdentity(subject=subject, email=email, claims=claims)
@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
from argon2 import PasswordHasher
from argon2.exceptions import VerifyMismatchError
from argon2.exceptions import InvalidHashError, VerifyMismatchError
from auth_gateway.models.auth import UserModel
password_hasher = PasswordHasher()
# Checked when the user does not exist, so the response time does not reveal which usernames exist
DUMMY_PASSWORD_HASH = password_hasher.hash("unused-password")
MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH = 1024
@@ -14,10 +15,9 @@ def verify_user_password(username: str, password: str, users: dict[str, UserMode
if not password or len(password) > MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH:
return None
user = users.get(username)
if not user or not user.password_hash:
return None
password_hash = user.password_hash if user and user.password_hash else DUMMY_PASSWORD_HASH
try:
password_hasher.verify(user.password_hash, password)
except VerifyMismatchError:
password_hasher.verify(password_hash, password)
except (VerifyMismatchError, InvalidHashError):
return None
return user
return user if password_hash is not DUMMY_PASSWORD_HASH else None
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
import posixpath
import re
from dataclasses import dataclass
from urllib.parse import unquote, urlsplit
from urllib.parse import unquote
from auth_gateway.models.applications import ApplicationModel
from auth_gateway.models.routes import AppRoutesModel, RoutePolicyBindingModel
@@ -21,16 +22,22 @@ def normalize_host(raw_host: str) -> str:
def normalize_path(raw_uri: str) -> str:
parsed = urlsplit(raw_uri or "/")
path = unquote(parsed.path or "/")
"""
Path used to pick the policy, normalized the same way Caddy matches routes: repeated slashes are merged and
. and .. segments are resolved. The value is a request URI, never a full URL, so a leading // is part of the
path and not a network location.
"""
path = re.split(r"[?#]", raw_uri or "/", maxsplit=1)[0]
path = unquote(path) or "/"
path = path if path.startswith("/") else f"/{path}"
# Resolve any .. or . segments to prevent path traversal bypasses
path = re.sub(r"/{2,}", "/", path)
return posixpath.normpath(path)
def _path_matches(path: str, prefix: str) -> bool:
"""Check path boundary correctly — prevents /admin matching /administrator."""
prefix = prefix.rstrip("/")
"""Check path boundary correctly — prevents /admin matching /administrator. Case-insensitive, like Caddy."""
path = path.lower()
prefix = prefix.rstrip("/").lower()
return path == prefix or path.startswith(prefix + "/")
@@ -1,9 +1,23 @@
import hashlib
import logging
import time
from datetime import datetime
import pyotp
logger = logging.getLogger("uvicorn.error")
VALID_WINDOW = 1
# (secret hash, time step) of codes already accepted, so a code cannot be used twice
_used_codes: dict[tuple[str, int], float] = {}
def _forget_expired_codes(now: float, interval: int) -> None:
oldest = now - interval * (2 * VALID_WINDOW + 2)
for key, used_at in list(_used_codes.items()):
if used_at < oldest:
del _used_codes[key]
def verify_totp(secret: str, token: str) -> bool:
normalized_secret = secret.strip()
@@ -15,4 +29,17 @@ def verify_totp(secret: str, token: str) -> bool:
except ValueError as error:
logger.warning("TOTP secret rejected (%s) — generate a new secret with at least 24 Base32 characters.", error)
return False
return totp.verify(normalized_token, valid_window=1)
now = time.time()
_forget_expired_codes(now, totp.interval)
secret_hash = hashlib.sha256(normalized_secret.encode()).hexdigest()
current_step = totp.timecode(datetime.fromtimestamp(now))
for offset in range(-VALID_WINDOW, VALID_WINDOW + 1):
step = current_step + offset
if pyotp.utils.strings_equal(normalized_token, totp.generate_otp(step)):
if (secret_hash, step) in _used_codes:
logger.warning("TOTP code reuse rejected.")
return False
_used_codes[(secret_hash, step)] = now
return True
return False