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wireguard_webadmin/containers/caddy/process_config.py
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Reads JSON config files exported by Django and generates /etc/caddy/Caddyfile.
Expected input files in /caddy_json_export/:
- wireguard_webadmin.json (required, generated on container startup)
- applications.json (optional, exported from Django)
- auth_policies.json (optional, exported from Django)
- routes.json (optional, exported from Django)
- tls.json (optional, exported from Django)
"""
import hashlib
import json
import os
import re
import shutil
import sys
from urllib.parse import urlparse
JSON_DIR = os.environ.get("JSON_DIR", "/caddy_json_export")
CADDYFILE_PATH = os.environ.get("CADDYFILE_PATH", "/etc/caddy/Caddyfile")
AUTH_GATEWAY_INTERNAL_URL = os.environ.get("AUTH_GATEWAY_INTERNAL_URL", "http://wireguard-webadmin-auth-gateway:9091")
AUTH_GATEWAY_PORTAL_PATH = os.environ.get("AUTH_GATEWAY_EXTERNAL_PATH", "/auth-gateway")
AUTH_GATEWAY_CHECK_URI = "/auth/check"
CERTIFICATE_TYPES = ("self_signed", "http_challenge", "dns_challenge")
DEFAULT_CERTIFICATE_TYPE = "http_challenge"
ACME_CERTIFICATE_TYPES = ("http_challenge", "dns_challenge")
# The propagation check queries DNS from this server, which fails on networks that intercept
# port 53 traffic. Waiting a fixed delay and letting the CA validate from outside is more reliable.
ACME_DNS_PROPAGATION_DELAY = "30s"
CADDY_DATA_DIR = os.path.join(os.environ.get("XDG_DATA_HOME", "/data"), "caddy")
CERTIFICATES_DIR = os.path.join(CADDY_DATA_DIR, "certificates")
INTERNAL_ISSUER_DIR_NAME = "local"
TLS_STATE_PATH = os.path.join(CADDY_DATA_DIR, "wireguard_webadmin_tls_state.json")
TLS_STATE_PENDING_PATH = f"{CADDYFILE_PATH}.tls_state.json"
# Set by entrypoint.sh when the generated Caddyfile fails validation
DISABLE_DNS_CHALLENGE = os.environ.get("DISABLE_DNS_CHALLENGE", "") == "1"
AUTH_IDENTITY_HEADERS = (
"X-Auth-User",
"X-Auth-Email",
"X-Auth-Groups",
"X-Auth-Factors",
"X-Auth-Policy",
)
def load_json(filename):
filepath = os.path.join(JSON_DIR, filename)
if not os.path.exists(filepath):
return None
with open(filepath, "r", encoding="utf-8") as json_file:
return json.load(json_file)
def collect_all_applications():
apps = []
webadmin_data = load_json("wireguard_webadmin.json")
if webadmin_data:
apps.extend(webadmin_data.get("entries", []))
applications_data = load_json("applications.json")
if applications_data:
apps.extend(applications_data.get("entries", []))
return apps
def split_upstream(upstream):
"""Return (base_url, upstream_path) where base_url has no path component.
Upstreams without an explicit http(s):// scheme are returned as-is with no path."""
if not upstream.startswith("http://") and not upstream.startswith("https://"):
return upstream, ""
parsed = urlparse(upstream)
base = f"{parsed.scheme}://{parsed.netloc}"
path = parsed.path.rstrip("/")
return base, path
def _safe_value(val: str) -> str:
"""Strip characters that would break or inject into a Caddyfile directive."""
return re.sub(r"[\r\n\x00]", "", val)
def _quote_value(val) -> str:
escaped = _safe_value(str(val)).replace("\\", "\\\\").replace('"', '\\"')
return f'"{escaped}"'
def _safe_identifier(val: str) -> str:
return re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9_]", "", str(val))
def get_host_tls(host, tls_data):
"""
Return (certificate_type, dns_credential_name, certificate_fallback) for a host.
Hosts not listed use the HTTP challenge with fallback.
"""
host_tls = tls_data.get("hosts", {}).get(host.lower(), {})
certificate_type = host_tls.get("certificate_type", DEFAULT_CERTIFICATE_TYPE)
if certificate_type not in CERTIFICATE_TYPES:
certificate_type = DEFAULT_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
dns_credential = None
if certificate_type == "dns_challenge":
dns_credential = host_tls.get("dns_credential")
if DISABLE_DNS_CHALLENGE or dns_credential not in tls_data.get("dns_credentials", {}):
certificate_type = DEFAULT_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
dns_credential = None
certificate_fallback = certificate_type == "self_signed" or host_tls.get("certificate_fallback", True) is not False
return certificate_type, dns_credential, certificate_fallback
def group_hosts_by_tls(hosts, tls_data):
"""Hosts sharing the same certificate settings are served by the same site block."""
groups = {}
for host in hosts:
groups.setdefault(get_host_tls(host, tls_data), []).append(host)
return groups.items()
def build_caddyfile(apps, auth_policies, routes, tls_data=None):
tls_data = tls_data or {}
policies = auth_policies.get("policies", {}) if auth_policies else {}
route_entries = routes.get("entries", {}) if routes else {}
lines = []
def get_policy_type(policy_name):
if policy_name and policy_name in policies:
return policies[policy_name].get("policy_type", "bypass")
return "deny"
def emit_auth_portal():
lines.append(f" handle_path {AUTH_GATEWAY_PORTAL_PATH}/* {{")
lines.append(f" reverse_proxy {AUTH_GATEWAY_INTERNAL_URL}")
lines.append(" }")
lines.append("")
def emit_tls(certificate_type, dns_credential, certificate_fallback):
if certificate_type == "self_signed":
lines.append(" tls internal")
lines.append("")
return
lines.append(" tls {")
if certificate_type == "dns_challenge":
dns_credential_data = tls_data["dns_credentials"][dns_credential]
provider = _safe_identifier(dns_credential_data.get("provider", ""))
lines.append(" issuer acme {")
lines.append(f" dns {provider} {{")
for field_name, field_value in dns_credential_data.get("credentials", {}).items():
lines.append(f" {_safe_identifier(field_name)} {_quote_value(field_value)}")
lines.append(" }")
lines.append(f" propagation_delay {ACME_DNS_PROPAGATION_DELAY}")
lines.append(" propagation_timeout -1")
lines.append(" }")
else:
lines.append(" issuer acme")
if certificate_fallback:
# Fall back to the internal CA when the ACME certificate cannot be issued
lines.append(" issuer internal")
lines.append(" }")
lines.append("")
def emit_identity_header_sanitization(indent=" "):
for header_name in AUTH_IDENTITY_HEADERS:
lines.append(f"{indent}request_header -{header_name}")
def emit_encoded_slash_block():
# Reject paths containing encoded slashes in any depth of percent-encoding:
# %2f = /
# %252f = %2f (double-encoded, decodes to / on second pass)
# %25252f = triple-encoded, etc.
# Caddy's path matcher does not decode percent-encoding, so /%2fadmin would
# NOT match path /admin and would fall through to the default (potentially
# bypass) handler even though some upstreams decode it to /admin.
lines.append(" @encoded_slash {")
lines.append(" path_regexp (?i)%(?:25)*2f")
lines.append(" }")
lines.append(" handle @encoded_slash {")
lines.append(" respond 400")
lines.append(" }")
lines.append("")
def emit_route_matcher(matcher_name, path_prefix):
matcher_name = re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9_]", "_", matcher_name)
normalized_prefix = path_prefix.strip().rstrip("/") or "/"
if not normalized_prefix.startswith("/"):
normalized_prefix = f"/{normalized_prefix}"
if normalized_prefix == "/":
return None
lines.append(f" @{matcher_name} {{")
lines.append(f" path {normalized_prefix} {normalized_prefix}/*")
lines.append(" }")
lines.append("")
return f"@{matcher_name}"
def handle_open(matcher=None):
if not matcher:
return " handle {"
return f" handle {matcher} {{"
def emit_reverse_proxy(base, upstream_path, indent=" ", allow_invalid_cert=False):
if upstream_path:
lines.append(f"{indent}rewrite * {upstream_path}{{uri}}")
if allow_invalid_cert:
lines.append(f"{indent}reverse_proxy {base} {{")
lines.append(f"{indent} transport http {{")
lines.append(f"{indent} tls_insecure_skip_verify")
lines.append(f"{indent} }}")
lines.append(f"{indent}}}")
else:
lines.append(f"{indent}reverse_proxy {base}")
def emit_protected_handle(path_matcher, base, upstream_path, allow_invalid_cert=False):
lines.append(handle_open(path_matcher))
lines.append(f" forward_auth {AUTH_GATEWAY_INTERNAL_URL} {{")
lines.append(f" uri {AUTH_GATEWAY_CHECK_URI}")
lines.append(" copy_headers X-Auth-User X-Auth-Email X-Auth-Groups X-Auth-Factors X-Auth-Policy")
lines.append(" }")
emit_reverse_proxy(base, upstream_path, allow_invalid_cert=allow_invalid_cert)
lines.append(" }")
lines.append("")
def emit_site_block(app, hosts, certificate_type, dns_credential, certificate_fallback):
upstream = app.get("upstream", "")
# tls_insecure_skip_verify is only valid for https upstreams
allow_invalid_cert = app.get("allow_invalid_cert", False) and upstream.startswith("https://")
static_routes = app.get("static_routes", [])
app_id = app.get("id", "")
base, upstream_path = split_upstream(upstream)
safe_hosts = [_safe_value(h) for h in hosts]
lines.append(f"{', '.join(safe_hosts)} {{")
emit_tls(certificate_type, dns_credential, certificate_fallback)
lines.append(" # Security: overwrite client-supplied forwarding headers with verified values")
lines.append(" request_header X-Forwarded-For {http.request.remote.host}")
lines.append(" request_header -X-Forwarded-Host")
emit_identity_header_sanitization()
lines.append("")
emit_encoded_slash_block()
emit_auth_portal()
for static_route in static_routes:
path_prefix = _safe_value(static_route.get("path_prefix", ""))
root_dir = _safe_value(static_route.get("root", ""))
cache_control = _safe_value(static_route.get("cache_control", ""))
lines.append(f" handle_path {path_prefix}/* {{")
lines.append(f" root * {root_dir}")
lines.append(" file_server")
if cache_control:
lines.append(f" header Cache-Control \"{cache_control}\"")
lines.append(" }")
lines.append("")
app_route_data = route_entries.get(app_id)
if app_route_data is None:
emit_reverse_proxy(base, upstream_path, indent=" ", allow_invalid_cert=allow_invalid_cert)
lines.append("}")
lines.append("")
return
route_list = sorted(app_route_data.get("routes", []), key=lambda route: len(route.get("path_prefix", "")), reverse=True)
for route_index, route in enumerate(route_list):
path_prefix = route.get("path_prefix", "/")
policy_type = get_policy_type(route.get("policy"))
matcher = emit_route_matcher(f"route_{app_id}_{route_index}", path_prefix)
if policy_type == "bypass":
lines.append(handle_open(matcher))
emit_reverse_proxy(base, upstream_path, allow_invalid_cert=allow_invalid_cert)
lines.append(" }")
lines.append("")
elif policy_type == "deny":
lines.append(handle_open(matcher))
lines.append(" respond 403")
lines.append(" }")
lines.append("")
else:
emit_protected_handle(matcher, base, upstream_path, allow_invalid_cert=allow_invalid_cert)
default_policy_type = get_policy_type(app_route_data.get("default_policy"))
if default_policy_type == "bypass":
emit_reverse_proxy(base, upstream_path, indent=" ", allow_invalid_cert=allow_invalid_cert)
elif default_policy_type == "deny":
lines.append(" respond 403")
else:
emit_protected_handle(None, base, upstream_path, allow_invalid_cert=allow_invalid_cert)
lines.append("}")
lines.append("")
for app in apps:
hosts = app.get("hosts", [])
if not hosts or not app.get("upstream", ""):
continue
for (certificate_type, dns_credential, certificate_fallback), group_hosts in group_hosts_by_tls(hosts, tls_data):
emit_site_block(app, group_hosts, certificate_type, dns_credential, certificate_fallback)
return "\n".join(lines)
def build_tls_state(apps, tls_data):
"""Map each host to a fingerprint of the certificate settings used in the generated Caddyfile."""
tls_data = tls_data or {}
tls_state = {}
for app in apps:
if not app.get("hosts") or not app.get("upstream"):
continue
for host in app["hosts"]:
certificate_type, dns_credential, certificate_fallback = get_host_tls(host, tls_data)
credential_hash = ""
if dns_credential:
credential_data = json.dumps(tls_data["dns_credentials"][dns_credential], sort_keys=True)
credential_hash = hashlib.sha256(credential_data.encode()).hexdigest()
certificate_generation = tls_data.get("hosts", {}).get(host.lower(), {}).get("certificate_generation", 0)
tls_state[host.lower()] = [
certificate_type, dns_credential or "", credential_hash, certificate_fallback, certificate_generation
]
return tls_state
def _write_json(filepath, data):
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(filepath), exist_ok=True)
with open(filepath, "w", encoding="utf-8") as json_file:
json.dump(data, json_file)
def _read_json(filepath):
if not os.path.exists(filepath):
return None
with open(filepath, "r", encoding="utf-8") as json_file:
return json.load(json_file)
def has_acme_certificate(host):
if not os.path.isdir(CERTIFICATES_DIR):
return False
for issuer_dir_name in os.listdir(CERTIFICATES_DIR):
if issuer_dir_name == INTERNAL_ISSUER_DIR_NAME:
continue
if os.path.isfile(os.path.join(CERTIFICATES_DIR, issuer_dir_name, host, f"{host}.crt")):
return True
return False
def sync_tls_state():
"""
Compare the certificate settings of the last generated Caddyfile with the ones currently applied.
For hosts whose ACME settings changed (including a retry request), the fallback certificate from the
internal CA is removed so a new ACME certificate is requested right away instead of on the next renewal.
Prints "restart" when Caddy must be restarted, since a reload keeps cached certificates in memory. Hosts
that already hold an ACME certificate and had no fallback certificate removed do not require a restart.
"""
pending_state = _read_json(TLS_STATE_PENDING_PATH)
if pending_state is None:
return
applied_state = _read_json(TLS_STATE_PATH)
restart_required = False
if applied_state is not None:
for host, host_state in pending_state.items():
if applied_state.get(host) in (None, host_state):
continue
if "/" in host or host in ("", ".", ".."):
continue
if host_state[0] not in ACME_CERTIFICATE_TYPES:
# A cached ACME certificate would keep being served instead of the self-signed one
if has_acme_certificate(host):
restart_required = True
continue
fallback_removed = False
fallback_certificate_dir = os.path.join(CERTIFICATES_DIR, INTERNAL_ISSUER_DIR_NAME, host)
if os.path.isdir(fallback_certificate_dir):
shutil.rmtree(fallback_certificate_dir)
fallback_removed = True
print(f"Removed fallback certificate for {host}", file=sys.stderr)
if fallback_removed or not has_acme_certificate(host):
restart_required = True
_write_json(TLS_STATE_PATH, pending_state)
if restart_required:
print("restart")
def main():
apps = collect_all_applications()
auth_policies = load_json("auth_policies.json")
routes = load_json("routes.json")
tls_data = load_json("tls.json")
caddyfile_content = build_caddyfile(apps, auth_policies, routes, tls_data)
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(CADDYFILE_PATH), exist_ok=True)
with open(CADDYFILE_PATH, "w", encoding="utf-8") as caddyfile:
caddyfile.write(caddyfile_content)
_write_json(TLS_STATE_PENDING_PATH, build_tls_state(apps, tls_data))
print(f"Caddyfile written to {CADDYFILE_PATH}")
if __name__ == "__main__":
if "--sync-tls-state" in sys.argv:
sync_tls_state()
else:
main()