enhance security by adding cache control headers, validating password length, and rejecting encoded slashes in path processing

This commit is contained in:
Eduardo Silva
2026-03-16 20:36:49 -03:00
parent ca63b87123
commit fb17394099
4 changed files with 26 additions and 3 deletions

View File

@@ -7,7 +7,12 @@ from auth_gateway.models.auth import UserModel
password_hasher = PasswordHasher()
MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH = 1024
def verify_user_password(username: str, password: str, users: dict[str, UserModel]) -> UserModel | None:
if not password or len(password) > MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH:
return None
user = users.get(username)
if not user or not user.password_hash:
return None

View File

@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ async def auth_check(request: Request):
return re.sub(r"[\r\n\x00]", "", value)
response = PlainTextResponse("OK", status_code=200)
response.headers["Cache-Control"] = "no-store"
if session:
if session.username:
response.headers["X-Auth-User"] = _safe_header(session.username)

View File

@@ -317,6 +317,7 @@ async def login_oidc_start(request: Request, next: str = "/"):
@router.get("/login/oidc/callback")
@limiter.limit(AUTH_RATE_LIMIT)
async def login_oidc_callback(request: Request, state: str):
runtime_config = get_runtime_config(request)
oidc_state = request.app.state.session_service.consume_oidc_state(state)
@@ -352,10 +353,12 @@ async def login_oidc_callback(request: Request, state: str):
def _safe_redirect_path(url: str | None) -> str:
"""Accept only relative paths to prevent open redirects."""
if not url or "://" in url or not url.startswith("/"):
"""Accept only relative paths to prevent open redirects, including protocol-relative URLs."""
if not url:
return "/"
return url
from urllib.parse import urlsplit
path = urlsplit(url).path or "/"
return path if path.startswith("/") else "/"
def _do_logout(request: Request, next_url: str = "/") -> RedirectResponse:

View File

@@ -81,6 +81,19 @@ def build_caddyfile(apps, auth_policies, routes):
for header_name in AUTH_IDENTITY_HEADERS:
lines.append(f"{indent}request_header -{header_name}")
def emit_encoded_slash_block():
# Reject paths containing %2f or %2F (percent-encoded slash).
# Caddy's path matcher does not decode percent-encoding, so /%2fadmin
# would NOT match path /admin and would fall through to the default
# (potentially bypass) handler, even though upstreams may decode it to /admin.
lines.append(" @encoded_slash {")
lines.append(" path_regexp (?i)%2f")
lines.append(" }")
lines.append(" handle @encoded_slash {")
lines.append(" respond 400")
lines.append(" }")
lines.append("")
def emit_route_matcher(matcher_name, path_prefix):
matcher_name = re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9_]", "_", matcher_name)
normalized_prefix = path_prefix.strip().rstrip("/") or "/"
@@ -139,6 +152,7 @@ def build_caddyfile(apps, auth_policies, routes):
lines.append(" request_header -X-Forwarded-Host")
emit_identity_header_sanitization()
lines.append("")
emit_encoded_slash_block()
emit_auth_portal()
for static_route in static_routes: