mirror of
https://github.com/eduardogsilva/wireguard_webadmin.git
synced 2026-11-21 04:23:15 +01:00
408 lines
17 KiB
Python
408 lines
17 KiB
Python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
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"""
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Reads JSON config files exported by Django and generates /etc/caddy/Caddyfile.
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Expected input files in /caddy_json_export/:
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- wireguard_webadmin.json (required, generated on container startup)
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- applications.json (optional, exported from Django)
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- auth_policies.json (optional, exported from Django)
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- routes.json (optional, exported from Django)
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- tls.json (optional, exported from Django)
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"""
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import hashlib
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import json
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import os
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import re
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import shutil
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import sys
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from urllib.parse import urlparse
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JSON_DIR = os.environ.get("JSON_DIR", "/caddy_json_export")
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CADDYFILE_PATH = os.environ.get("CADDYFILE_PATH", "/etc/caddy/Caddyfile")
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AUTH_GATEWAY_INTERNAL_URL = os.environ.get("AUTH_GATEWAY_INTERNAL_URL", "http://wireguard-webadmin-auth-gateway:9091")
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AUTH_GATEWAY_PORTAL_PATH = os.environ.get("AUTH_GATEWAY_EXTERNAL_PATH", "/auth-gateway")
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AUTH_GATEWAY_CHECK_URI = "/auth/check"
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CERTIFICATE_TYPES = ("self_signed", "http_challenge", "dns_challenge")
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DEFAULT_CERTIFICATE_TYPE = "http_challenge"
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ACME_CERTIFICATE_TYPES = ("http_challenge", "dns_challenge")
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# The propagation check queries DNS from this server, which fails on networks that intercept
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# port 53 traffic. Waiting a fixed delay and letting the CA validate from outside is more reliable.
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ACME_DNS_PROPAGATION_DELAY = "30s"
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CADDY_DATA_DIR = os.path.join(os.environ.get("XDG_DATA_HOME", "/data"), "caddy")
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CERTIFICATES_DIR = os.path.join(CADDY_DATA_DIR, "certificates")
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INTERNAL_ISSUER_DIR_NAME = "local"
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TLS_STATE_PATH = os.path.join(CADDY_DATA_DIR, "wireguard_webadmin_tls_state.json")
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TLS_STATE_PENDING_PATH = f"{CADDYFILE_PATH}.tls_state.json"
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# Set by entrypoint.sh when the generated Caddyfile fails validation
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DISABLE_DNS_CHALLENGE = os.environ.get("DISABLE_DNS_CHALLENGE", "") == "1"
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AUTH_IDENTITY_HEADERS = (
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"X-Auth-User",
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"X-Auth-Email",
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"X-Auth-Groups",
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"X-Auth-Factors",
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"X-Auth-Policy",
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)
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def load_json(filename):
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filepath = os.path.join(JSON_DIR, filename)
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if not os.path.exists(filepath):
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return None
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with open(filepath, "r", encoding="utf-8") as json_file:
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return json.load(json_file)
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def collect_all_applications():
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apps = []
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webadmin_data = load_json("wireguard_webadmin.json")
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if webadmin_data:
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apps.extend(webadmin_data.get("entries", []))
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applications_data = load_json("applications.json")
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if applications_data:
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apps.extend(applications_data.get("entries", []))
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return apps
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def split_upstream(upstream):
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"""Return (base_url, upstream_path) where base_url has no path component.
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Upstreams without an explicit http(s):// scheme are returned as-is with no path."""
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if not upstream.startswith("http://") and not upstream.startswith("https://"):
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return upstream, ""
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parsed = urlparse(upstream)
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base = f"{parsed.scheme}://{parsed.netloc}"
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path = parsed.path.rstrip("/")
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return base, path
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def _safe_value(val: str) -> str:
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"""Strip characters that would break or inject into a Caddyfile directive."""
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return re.sub(r"[\r\n\x00]", "", val)
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def _quote_value(val) -> str:
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escaped = _safe_value(str(val)).replace("\\", "\\\\").replace('"', '\\"')
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return f'"{escaped}"'
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def _safe_identifier(val: str) -> str:
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return re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9_]", "", str(val))
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def get_host_tls(host, tls_data):
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"""
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Return (certificate_type, dns_credential_name, certificate_fallback) for a host.
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Hosts not listed use the HTTP challenge with fallback.
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"""
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host_tls = tls_data.get("hosts", {}).get(host.lower(), {})
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certificate_type = host_tls.get("certificate_type", DEFAULT_CERTIFICATE_TYPE)
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if certificate_type not in CERTIFICATE_TYPES:
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certificate_type = DEFAULT_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
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dns_credential = None
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if certificate_type == "dns_challenge":
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dns_credential = host_tls.get("dns_credential")
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if DISABLE_DNS_CHALLENGE or dns_credential not in tls_data.get("dns_credentials", {}):
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certificate_type = DEFAULT_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
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dns_credential = None
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certificate_fallback = certificate_type == "self_signed" or host_tls.get("certificate_fallback", True) is not False
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return certificate_type, dns_credential, certificate_fallback
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def group_hosts_by_tls(hosts, tls_data):
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"""Hosts sharing the same certificate settings are served by the same site block."""
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groups = {}
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for host in hosts:
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groups.setdefault(get_host_tls(host, tls_data), []).append(host)
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return groups.items()
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def build_caddyfile(apps, auth_policies, routes, tls_data=None):
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tls_data = tls_data or {}
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policies = auth_policies.get("policies", {}) if auth_policies else {}
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route_entries = routes.get("entries", {}) if routes else {}
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lines = []
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def get_policy_type(policy_name):
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if policy_name and policy_name in policies:
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return policies[policy_name].get("policy_type", "bypass")
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return "deny"
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def emit_auth_portal():
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lines.append(f" handle_path {AUTH_GATEWAY_PORTAL_PATH}/* {{")
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lines.append(f" reverse_proxy {AUTH_GATEWAY_INTERNAL_URL}")
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lines.append(" }")
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lines.append("")
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def emit_tls(certificate_type, dns_credential, certificate_fallback):
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if certificate_type == "self_signed":
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lines.append(" tls internal")
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lines.append("")
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return
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lines.append(" tls {")
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if certificate_type == "dns_challenge":
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dns_credential_data = tls_data["dns_credentials"][dns_credential]
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provider = _safe_identifier(dns_credential_data.get("provider", ""))
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lines.append(" issuer acme {")
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lines.append(f" dns {provider} {{")
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for field_name, field_value in dns_credential_data.get("credentials", {}).items():
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lines.append(f" {_safe_identifier(field_name)} {_quote_value(field_value)}")
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lines.append(" }")
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lines.append(f" propagation_delay {ACME_DNS_PROPAGATION_DELAY}")
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lines.append(" propagation_timeout -1")
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lines.append(" }")
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else:
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lines.append(" issuer acme")
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if certificate_fallback:
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# Fall back to the internal CA when the ACME certificate cannot be issued
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lines.append(" issuer internal")
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lines.append(" }")
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lines.append("")
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def emit_identity_header_sanitization(indent=" "):
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for header_name in AUTH_IDENTITY_HEADERS:
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lines.append(f"{indent}request_header -{header_name}")
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def emit_encoded_slash_block():
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# Reject paths containing encoded slashes in any depth of percent-encoding:
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# %2f = /
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# %252f = %2f (double-encoded, decodes to / on second pass)
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# %25252f = triple-encoded, etc.
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# Caddy's path matcher does not decode percent-encoding, so /%2fadmin would
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# NOT match path /admin and would fall through to the default (potentially
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# bypass) handler even though some upstreams decode it to /admin.
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lines.append(" @encoded_slash {")
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lines.append(" path_regexp (?i)%(?:25)*2f")
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lines.append(" }")
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lines.append(" handle @encoded_slash {")
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lines.append(" respond 400")
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lines.append(" }")
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lines.append("")
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def emit_route_matcher(matcher_name, path_prefix):
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matcher_name = re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9_]", "_", matcher_name)
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normalized_prefix = path_prefix.strip().rstrip("/") or "/"
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if not normalized_prefix.startswith("/"):
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normalized_prefix = f"/{normalized_prefix}"
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if normalized_prefix == "/":
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return None
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lines.append(f" @{matcher_name} {{")
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lines.append(f" path {normalized_prefix} {normalized_prefix}/*")
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lines.append(" }")
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lines.append("")
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return f"@{matcher_name}"
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def handle_open(matcher=None):
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if not matcher:
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return " handle {"
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return f" handle {matcher} {{"
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def emit_reverse_proxy(base, upstream_path, indent=" ", allow_invalid_cert=False):
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if upstream_path:
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lines.append(f"{indent}rewrite * {upstream_path}{{uri}}")
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if allow_invalid_cert:
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lines.append(f"{indent}reverse_proxy {base} {{")
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lines.append(f"{indent} transport http {{")
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lines.append(f"{indent} tls_insecure_skip_verify")
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lines.append(f"{indent} }}")
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lines.append(f"{indent}}}")
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else:
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lines.append(f"{indent}reverse_proxy {base}")
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def emit_protected_handle(path_matcher, base, upstream_path, allow_invalid_cert=False):
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lines.append(handle_open(path_matcher))
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lines.append(f" forward_auth {AUTH_GATEWAY_INTERNAL_URL} {{")
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lines.append(f" uri {AUTH_GATEWAY_CHECK_URI}")
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lines.append(" copy_headers X-Auth-User X-Auth-Email X-Auth-Groups X-Auth-Factors X-Auth-Policy")
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lines.append(" }")
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emit_reverse_proxy(base, upstream_path, allow_invalid_cert=allow_invalid_cert)
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lines.append(" }")
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lines.append("")
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def emit_site_block(app, hosts, certificate_type, dns_credential, certificate_fallback):
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upstream = app.get("upstream", "")
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# tls_insecure_skip_verify is only valid for https upstreams
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allow_invalid_cert = app.get("allow_invalid_cert", False) and upstream.startswith("https://")
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static_routes = app.get("static_routes", [])
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app_id = app.get("id", "")
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base, upstream_path = split_upstream(upstream)
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safe_hosts = [_safe_value(h) for h in hosts]
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lines.append(f"{', '.join(safe_hosts)} {{")
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emit_tls(certificate_type, dns_credential, certificate_fallback)
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lines.append(" # Security: overwrite client-supplied forwarding headers with verified values")
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lines.append(" request_header X-Forwarded-For {http.request.remote.host}")
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lines.append(" request_header -X-Forwarded-Host")
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emit_identity_header_sanitization()
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lines.append("")
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emit_encoded_slash_block()
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emit_auth_portal()
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for static_route in static_routes:
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path_prefix = _safe_value(static_route.get("path_prefix", ""))
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root_dir = _safe_value(static_route.get("root", ""))
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cache_control = _safe_value(static_route.get("cache_control", ""))
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lines.append(f" handle_path {path_prefix}/* {{")
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lines.append(f" root * {root_dir}")
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lines.append(" file_server")
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if cache_control:
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lines.append(f" header Cache-Control \"{cache_control}\"")
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lines.append(" }")
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lines.append("")
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app_route_data = route_entries.get(app_id)
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if app_route_data is None:
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emit_reverse_proxy(base, upstream_path, indent=" ", allow_invalid_cert=allow_invalid_cert)
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lines.append("}")
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lines.append("")
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return
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route_list = sorted(app_route_data.get("routes", []), key=lambda route: len(route.get("path_prefix", "")), reverse=True)
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for route_index, route in enumerate(route_list):
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path_prefix = route.get("path_prefix", "/")
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policy_type = get_policy_type(route.get("policy"))
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matcher = emit_route_matcher(f"route_{app_id}_{route_index}", path_prefix)
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if policy_type == "bypass":
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lines.append(handle_open(matcher))
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emit_reverse_proxy(base, upstream_path, allow_invalid_cert=allow_invalid_cert)
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lines.append(" }")
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lines.append("")
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elif policy_type == "deny":
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lines.append(handle_open(matcher))
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lines.append(" respond 403")
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lines.append(" }")
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lines.append("")
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else:
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emit_protected_handle(matcher, base, upstream_path, allow_invalid_cert=allow_invalid_cert)
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default_policy_type = get_policy_type(app_route_data.get("default_policy"))
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if default_policy_type == "bypass":
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emit_reverse_proxy(base, upstream_path, indent=" ", allow_invalid_cert=allow_invalid_cert)
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elif default_policy_type == "deny":
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lines.append(" respond 403")
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else:
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emit_protected_handle(None, base, upstream_path, allow_invalid_cert=allow_invalid_cert)
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lines.append("}")
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lines.append("")
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for app in apps:
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hosts = app.get("hosts", [])
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if not hosts or not app.get("upstream", ""):
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continue
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for (certificate_type, dns_credential, certificate_fallback), group_hosts in group_hosts_by_tls(hosts, tls_data):
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emit_site_block(app, group_hosts, certificate_type, dns_credential, certificate_fallback)
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return "\n".join(lines)
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def build_tls_state(apps, tls_data):
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"""Map each host to a fingerprint of the certificate settings used in the generated Caddyfile."""
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tls_data = tls_data or {}
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tls_state = {}
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for app in apps:
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if not app.get("hosts") or not app.get("upstream"):
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continue
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for host in app["hosts"]:
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certificate_type, dns_credential, certificate_fallback = get_host_tls(host, tls_data)
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credential_hash = ""
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if dns_credential:
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credential_data = json.dumps(tls_data["dns_credentials"][dns_credential], sort_keys=True)
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credential_hash = hashlib.sha256(credential_data.encode()).hexdigest()
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certificate_generation = tls_data.get("hosts", {}).get(host.lower(), {}).get("certificate_generation", 0)
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tls_state[host.lower()] = [
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certificate_type, dns_credential or "", credential_hash, certificate_fallback, certificate_generation
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]
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return tls_state
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def _write_json(filepath, data):
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os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(filepath), exist_ok=True)
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with open(filepath, "w", encoding="utf-8") as json_file:
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json.dump(data, json_file)
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def _read_json(filepath):
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if not os.path.exists(filepath):
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return None
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with open(filepath, "r", encoding="utf-8") as json_file:
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return json.load(json_file)
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def has_acme_certificate(host):
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if not os.path.isdir(CERTIFICATES_DIR):
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return False
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for issuer_dir_name in os.listdir(CERTIFICATES_DIR):
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if issuer_dir_name == INTERNAL_ISSUER_DIR_NAME:
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continue
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if os.path.isfile(os.path.join(CERTIFICATES_DIR, issuer_dir_name, host, f"{host}.crt")):
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return True
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return False
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def sync_tls_state():
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"""
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Compare the certificate settings of the last generated Caddyfile with the ones currently applied.
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For hosts whose ACME settings changed (including a retry request), the fallback certificate from the
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internal CA is removed so a new ACME certificate is requested right away instead of on the next renewal.
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Prints "restart" when Caddy must be restarted, since a reload keeps cached certificates in memory. Hosts
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that already hold an ACME certificate and had no fallback certificate removed do not require a restart.
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"""
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pending_state = _read_json(TLS_STATE_PENDING_PATH)
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if pending_state is None:
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return
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applied_state = _read_json(TLS_STATE_PATH)
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restart_required = False
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if applied_state is not None:
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for host, host_state in pending_state.items():
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if applied_state.get(host) in (None, host_state):
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continue
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if "/" in host or host in ("", ".", ".."):
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continue
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if host_state[0] not in ACME_CERTIFICATE_TYPES:
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# A cached ACME certificate would keep being served instead of the self-signed one
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if has_acme_certificate(host):
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restart_required = True
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continue
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fallback_removed = False
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fallback_certificate_dir = os.path.join(CERTIFICATES_DIR, INTERNAL_ISSUER_DIR_NAME, host)
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if os.path.isdir(fallback_certificate_dir):
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shutil.rmtree(fallback_certificate_dir)
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fallback_removed = True
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print(f"Removed fallback certificate for {host}", file=sys.stderr)
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if fallback_removed or not has_acme_certificate(host):
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restart_required = True
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_write_json(TLS_STATE_PATH, pending_state)
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if restart_required:
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print("restart")
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def main():
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apps = collect_all_applications()
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auth_policies = load_json("auth_policies.json")
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routes = load_json("routes.json")
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tls_data = load_json("tls.json")
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caddyfile_content = build_caddyfile(apps, auth_policies, routes, tls_data)
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os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(CADDYFILE_PATH), exist_ok=True)
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with open(CADDYFILE_PATH, "w", encoding="utf-8") as caddyfile:
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caddyfile.write(caddyfile_content)
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_write_json(TLS_STATE_PENDING_PATH, build_tls_state(apps, tls_data))
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print(f"Caddyfile written to {CADDYFILE_PATH}")
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if __name__ == "__main__":
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if "--sync-tls-state" in sys.argv:
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sync_tls_state()
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else:
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main()
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